An Examination Of The Logic of Multiculturalism
In The Genesis of Political Correctness: The Basis of a False Morality, concerning The Frankfurt School’s The Authoritarian Personality report (conducted in the USA in 1950) I wrote:
‘The report was proved correct in its assertion that it would be possible to control and manipulate Conservatives by using the law – certainly so far as Britain is concerned. The Tories are very diligent in implementing the law, even those laws which are hostile to Conservatism and British interests (e.g. the Human Rights Act, or the Equality Act that was dubbed “socialism in one clause”). Time and again, Tory politicians can be found pontificating about Britain’s “international obligations”. Mindlessly implementing laws based on abstract theories and political correctness renders genuine morality and patriotism redundant.’
I also highlighted the manner in which judges and lawyers were exploiting human rights laws for their own agenda:
‘The activities of the judges and lawyers is anti-democratic, and they display scant regard for the interests and views of ordinary people. This is openly stated and is a long-standing viewpoint, as the judge Lord Bingham showed when he described the Human Rights Convention as “intrinsically counter-majoritarian” and that decisions to uphold the rights of minorities “should provoke howls of criticism by politicians and the mass media. They generally reflect majority opinion.” Britain has become a lawyers’ dictatorship.
In a speech in Melbourne, Australia, Lord Neuberger, the President of the Supreme Court and Britain’s most senior judge, said that the Human Rights Act allowed judges to “interpret statutes in a way which some may say amounts not so much to construction as to demolition and reconstruction. We can give provisions meanings which they could not possibly bear if the normal rules of statutory interpretation applied. Parliament has written us judges something of a blank cheque in this connection … this new judicial power of quasi-interpretation can be said to involve a subtle but significant adjustment to the balance of power between the legislature and the judiciary … The [British] approach can be seen as effectively conferring a law-making function on the judiciary.”
Neuberger, in June 2015 in a speech to commemorate the Magna Carta, said: “The need to offer oneself for re-election sometimes makes it hard to make unpopular, but correct decisions. At times it can be an advantage to have an independent body of people who do not have to worry about short term popularity.” In reference to “judicial aggrandisement”, Neuberger highlighted that the EU law and the Human Rights Act had given the judges a “quasi-constitutional function”.
Britain’s judges have embraced their own interpretation of their newfangled human rights role with eagerness. In reference to his decision to allow a Bangladeshi murderer to move to England, overturning a Home Office decision, Judge Peter King proclaimed: “There seems to be an expectation that the public interest trumps everything else. It seems to me that is not necessarily the case.” The Bangladeshi was further granted anonymity to protect his identity and his criminal record.’
In Brexit Means Brexit: How the British Ponzi Class Survived the EU Referendum, I wrote:
‘As a former world power with an empire, Britain should be experienced in how a nation state can establish sovereignty and how to grant independence. Britain granted independence to its colonies far more quickly than apparently we are given to understand it is possible to leave the EU, and the issues of decolonization were immeasurably more complex. Another useful comparison is the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had its own version of Article 50 – Article 72 – including a law “On the procedure for resolution of issues in connection with a withdrawal of a Union republic from the USSR.” The process was for there to be a referendum in the “member state”, after which it would notify the Supreme Soviet of the Union, which would then refer the matter to the Congress of People’s Deputies, who would then set up a transitional period of up to five years “to resolve the issues arising in connection with the withdrawal of the Republic from the USSR”. USSR law would continue to be enforced during the transitional period.
Within two years of this law being passed, all 15 Soviet Republics had withdrawn from the USSR, and not one of them followed the procedure. All 15 republics made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence by passing a motion in their own parliaments and withdrew unconditionally. The USSR made threats, objected and demanded that if necessary, there should be an “amicable divorce” by following the procedure. The USSR’s objections and threats were ignored.
The white paper itself acknowledged that it is only by repealing the 1972 Act that Britain can leave the EU:
“The Great Repeal Bill will do three main things:
a. First, it will repeal the ECA [the 1972 European Communities Act] and return power to UK institutions.
b. Second, subject to the detail of the proposals set out in this White Paper, the Bill will convert EU law as it stands at the moment of exit into UK law before we leave the EU. This allows businesses to continue operating knowing the rules have not changed significantly overnight, and provides fairness to individuals, whose rights and obligations will not be subject to sudden change. It also ensures that it will be up to the UK Parliament (and, where appropriate, the devolved legislatures) to amend, repeal or improve any piece of EU law (once it has been brought into UK law) at the appropriate time once we have left the EU.
c. Finally, the Bill will create powers to make secondary legislation. This will enable corrections to be made to the laws that would otherwise no longer operate appropriately once we have left the EU, so that our legal system continues to function correctly outside the EU, and will also enable domestic law once we have left the EU to reflect the content of any withdrawal agreement under Article 50.”
The white paper continued:
“The ECA gives effect in UK law to the EU treaties. It incorporates EU law into the UK domestic legal order and provides for the supremacy of EU law. It also requires UK courts to follow the rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) … As a first step, it is important to repeal the ECA to ensure there is maximum clarity as to the law that applies in the UK, and to reflect the fact that following the UK’s exit from the EU it will be UK law, not EU law, that is supreme. The Bill will repeal the ECA on the day we leave the EU.”
Of course, the day Britain leaves the EU has been delayed by the May Government. Were the repeal of the 1972 Act to be done immediately rather than delayed, then Britain would leave immediately. It is only by repealing the 1972 Act that Britain ends “the supremacy of EU law” and leaves the EU.
The Great Repeal Bill was intended to remove the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights from British law, and tellingly, it promised: “The ECHR is an instrument of the Council of Europe, not of the EU. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will not change the UK’s participation in the ECHR and there are no plans to withdraw from the ECHR.” The May Government remained committed to the ECHR.’
In the recent House of Commons debate on the Internal Markets Bill regarding the Withdrawal Agreement, which is now described as international law, the now former prime minister, Theresa May said:
‘There is an arbitration process available. Under article 175, the ruling of the arbitration panel should be binding on the UK and the EU. The Government have acknowledged the existence of the arbitration procedure, but they are saying that they would enter into that in parallel with the operation of the elements of this Bill. The message, it seems to me, is very clear, which is, if we do not like the outcome of the arbitration panel, then we will break international law and we will not accept it. Yet, again, that is breaking the international treaty – an agreement that UK Government signed – because it is breaking article 175, which says that the view of the arbitration panel shall be “binding” on both parties. However, there is not just an arbitration process available. As the right hon. Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) referred to, article 16 says:
“If the application of this Protocol leads to serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties that are liable to persist, or to diversion of trade, the Union or the United Kingdom may unilaterally take appropriate safeguard measures.”
Clauses 41 to 45 are not necessary.’
And:
‘These reasons alone should I think be sufficient for the Government to abandon these clauses, but perhaps the most compelling reason is my third, which is this Government’s wish to break international law and taking the powers to do so. As the Law Society and the Bar Council have said:
“These provisions enable Ministers to derogate from the obligations of the United Kingdom under international law in broad and comprehensive terms and prohibit public bodies from compliance with such obligations. They represent a direct challenge to the rule of law, which include the country’s obligations under public international law.”
I cannot emphasise enough how concerned I am that a Conservative Government are willing to go back on their word, to break an international agreement signed in good faith and to break international law.’
And:
‘I consider that, in introducing clauses 41 to 45, the Government are acting recklessly and irresponsibly, with no thought to the long-term impact on the United Kingdom’s standing in the world. It will lead to untold damage to the United Kingdom’s reputation and puts its future at risk. As a result, with regret I have to tell the Minister that I cannot support this Bill.’
That Theresa May has now changed her mind on the need to ensure that ‘following the UK’s exit from the EU it will be UK law, not EU law, that is supreme’ (as set out in the above white paper, produced by her government when she was prime minister), and that she now wants so-called international law to be supreme, comes against an ideological backdrop that is not restricted to the Brexit debate.
Writing in 2011 (translated into English and published in the UK in 2012, a time when the pressure for a referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was mounting), the Frankfurt School’s Jurgen Habermas wrote that there should be ‘a constitutionalization of international law … [and] a future cosmopolitan rule of law: the European Union can be understood as an important stage along the route to a politically constituted world society’ (The Crisis of the European Union: A Response – Jurgen Habermas, Polity Press Cambridge, 2012). In his book, Habermas made clear that he regarded the EU as a template and a stepping stone towards international government with nation states being subordinate to international law imposed by the UN. He further bemoaned what he saw as a failure of national politicians to confront their electorates:
‘One would expect the politicians to lay the European cards on the table without further delay and to take the initiative in explaining to the public the relation between the short-term costs and the true benefits, and hence the historical importance of the European project. In order to do so, they would have to overcome their fear of shifting public needs as measured by opinion polls and rely on the persuasive power of good arguments. All of the governments involved, and for the time being all of the political parties, are flinching at this step. Many of them are instead pandering to the populism which they themselves have cultivated by obfuscating a complex and unpopular topic.’
There are several lessons to be learnt from all this: